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Abstract    Testimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between 
their experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of social 
scientific and humanistic study. Often discussed in terms of “the disability 
paradox,” these studies contrast the intuitive horribleness of certain impaired 
states against the testimonial evidence suggesting that people in such states do not 
in fact experience their lives as horrible. Explanations for why such testimonial 
evidence is suspect range from claims about adaptive preferences to issues of 
qualitative research methodology. In this paper, I argue that the problem lies not 
with the evidence, but the intuitions in question. Using the disability paradox as a 
case study, I further argue against the use of the concept of intuitive horribleness 
in social epistemology. I contend that hermeneutical and contributory injustice are 
baked into most deployments of the concept, and even if one were to justify its 
use in select cases, it should be accompanied with prima facie suspicion. In 
conclusion, I discuss the implications of this analysis for the literature on 
transformative experience and also for the stakes of multi-cultural, historically 
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1   Disability and human experience1 
 
Disability is a fact of human life. One will invariably experience various impaired 
states over the course of any given life, and one will become significantly 
impaired as a product of aging if nothing else, should one live a long life. 
Testimony by disabled people concerning the relationship between their 
experiences and overall well-being has long been an object of social scientific and 
humanistic study. Yet, the ubiquity of disability experience, combined with the 
widespread assumption that disabilities are characterized simply by lack, has led 
some to treat testimony concerning the relationship between disability and lived 
experience to be subject to common sense. Often discussed in terms of “the 
disability paradox,” a contrast is typically set up between the intuitive 
horribleness of certain impaired states and the testimonial evidence suggesting 
that people in such states do not in fact experience their lives as horrible. 
Explanations for why that testimonial evidence is suspect range from claims about 
adaptive preferences to issues of qualitative research methodology (cf. Barnes 
2009).  
 
In this paper, I argue that the problem lies not with the evidence, but the intuition 
in question. Using the disability paradox as a case study, I further argue against 
the use of the concept of intuitive horribleness in social epistemology. I contend 
that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are baked into most deployments of 
the concept, and even if one were to convincingly justify its use in select cases, it 
should be accompanied with prima facie suspicion. In conclusion, I discuss the 
implications of this analysis for the literature on transformative experience, an 
account on which intuitively horrible experiences are taken to present serious 
problems, and also for the stakes of multi-cultural, historically informed 
philosophical analyses more generally. 
2   The disability paradox 
 
The “disability paradox” was first formulated in 1999 and has since then taken on 
a life of its own in the humanities, social sciences, and various clinical domains 
(e.g., see Honeybul et al. 2016; Fellinghauer et al. 2012). 
 
1 I want to thank Quill Kukla and Ally Peabody Smith as well as the anonymous reviewers for 
helpful feedback. I am also grateful for various conversations with many people over the last 
nearly-a-decade that came to shape this paper, especially Christine Wieseler, Erik Parens, 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Elizabeth Barnes, Lauren Guilmette, Jennifer Scuro, David Peña-
Guzmán, Bryan Mukandi, and Elizabeth Dietz. 
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The common understanding of a good quality of life implies being in good 
health and experiencing subjective well-being and life satisfaction [Goode, 
1994]. Conversely, one can argue that if people have disabilities, they 
cannot be considered to be in good health nor possess a high level of life 
satisfaction. People with disabilities are assumed to be limited in function 
and role performance and quite possibly stigmatized and underprivileged 
[Brown et al., 1994]. Kottke [1982, 80], a distinguished expert in 
rehabilitation medicine, expresses this view when he states that ‘the 
disabled patient has a greater problem in achieving a satisfactory quality 
of life. He has lost, or possibly never had, the physical capacity for the 
necessary responses to establish and maintain the relationships, 
interactions, and participation that healthy persons have.’ Research 
evidence, however, presents a more complex picture. In practice, the 
anomaly is that patients' perceptions of personal health, well-being, and 
life satisfaction are often discordant with their objective health status and 
disability [Albrecht and Higgins, 1977; Albrecht, 1994] (Albrecht and 
Devlieger 1999). 
The disability paradox is fundamentally animated by assumptions concerning that 
which is intuitively horrible.2 Furthermore, the framework of the paradox involves 
two major assumptions: (i) disability experiences are both knowable and 
accessible to able-bodied people and (ii) judgments concerning intuitively 
horrible experiences are not subjective, but objective. Note that Albrecht and 
Devlieger begin with a reference to “common understanding,” and this concept 
appears to function in a roughly similar way to that of “intuition.” One might 
counter that although they refer to and rely upon “common understanding,” the 
ultimate authority concerning the relationship between well-being and disability is 
placed in medical expertise—in this case, a “distinguished expert in rehabilitation 
medicine.” Yet, that would mistake a superficial rhetorical move (put less 
charitably, an argumentum ad verecundiam) for the underlying argumentative 
force. Albrecht and Devlieger assume that readers already agree with “the 
common understanding of a good quality of life” as defined by “being in good 
health and experiencing subjective well-being and life satisfaction.”3 They then 
 
2 To be clear, Albrecht and Devliger are, in the end, critical of the disability paradox despite their 
use of it as a framing device for research concerning disability. Near the end of their study, they 
write, “the sociological evidence suggests, then, that low quality of life for persons with 
disabilities is based on difficult-to-manage impairments, lack of knowledge and resources, and 
disabling environments. Theoretical efforts to understand quality of life among persons with 
disabilities and intervention efforts designed to enable and empower these individuals will build 
on both the organic base of impairments and the social model of disability” (986). 
3 This is a notoriously controversial claim, but it is beside the point to engage it here. Cf. (Kukla 
2015). 
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immediately imply that disability, whatever else it is, involves lacking good 
health and a high level of life satisfaction. The invocation of a medical expert 
buttresses what they take their readers to already assume to be true. The “research 
evidence” surprises the reader as well as the experts by suggesting that they are 
both wrong—or at least they seem to be so relative to the testimony of those who 
in fact have had the experiences in question. 
 
In summary, the claims of disabled people concerning their wellbeing appear 
paradoxical just insofar as intuitions by non-disabled people concerning the 
(objective) horribleness of their experience hold. This is significant, for charges of 
intuitive horribleness often play a decisive role in social epistemology debates. I 
argue below that these intuitions are wrong in a way that not only runs afoul of 
social scientific research but also concerns of epistemic injustice. First, however, 
and to better appreciate the power of the claim of “intuitive horribleness,” I turn 
to consider its function in debates over transformative experience and by focusing 
upon what has recently been termed “the shark problem.” The intuitive 
horribleness asserted relative to this problem is in fact a species of the disability 
paradox and one that specifically conflates the value of an epistemically 
transformative experience with that of a personally transformative experience. 
3   Intuition and horribleness 
 
L.A. Paul writes, “in cases like [being eaten by] sharks, we don’t need to perform 
an assessment of the outcome by cognitively modelling what it would be like, 
because we know what the results would be: we know every outcome is bad, 
whatever it is like (Paul 2014: 128; cf. 27).” Campbell and Mosquera generalize 
from this quote to develop what they call:  
 
The Shark Claim: One can evaluate and compare certain intuitively 
horrible outcomes (e.g., being eaten alive by sharks) as bad, and worse 
than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively 
horrible outcomes are like. [cf. Paul 2014: 127; cf. 27] (2020: 3551). 
 
Campbell and Mosquera continue by noting, “Paul discusses other examples such 
as being hit by a bus and having your legs amputated without anesthesia [Paul 
2014: 28, 127; 2015: 802–3].”4 They contrast the shark problem with what they 
 
4 Turning back to their core example, they add, “nobody, we hope, would deny that one can know 
that an experience of being eaten alive by sharks, for example, is bad even if one is not familiar 
with the precise phenomenology of that experience” (Idem). As I argue below, this appeal to 
common sense isn’t convincing in the way they intend because of how the shark problem and its 
core cases are constructed. 
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call the Prior Experience Claim, which is at the core of Paul’s theory of 
transformative experience: 
The Prior Experience Claim: One cannot evaluate and compare different 
experiential outcomes unless one can grasp what these outcomes are like, 
which one can do only if one has previously experienced outcomes of that 
kind [cf. Paul 2014: 2, 71–94] (Idem). 
“Evaluation” and “comparison” are here construed as functions of cognitive 
modelling. By virtue of having experiences of X kind, it is assumed that one can 
cognitively model outcomes pertaining to X in such a manner that one can 
judge—evaluate and compare—their subjective value. “Subjective value” just 
means, following Paul, the value(s) attached to undergoing X kind(s) of 
experience(s). As she details at length, the Prior Experience claim is especially 
pertinent to experiences the undergoing of which transform one as a knower. The 
following problem immediately arises: what distinguishes transformative 
experiences, to which the Prior Experience claim applies, from sharky 
experiences, to which the Prior Experience claim does not apply despite one not 
ever having undergone such experiences? 
 
Campbell and Mosquera attempt to solve this problem in two ways.5 They first 
adopt an approach that assumes a precise boundary between the two sorts of 
experience. This, expectedly, runs into the sorites paradox, and so they dismiss 
that solution. They then turn to a vagueness approach. After exploring 
supervaluationist, epistemicist, and ontic vagueness accounts, they argue that 
none solve the problem. This is because whether one focuses upon linguistic 
indecision, ineliminable uncertainty, or vagueness “out there” in the world, the 
problem of drawing a non-question-begging distinction between ‘normal’ and 
‘sharky’ cases of the evaluability of outcomes remains.6 On this basis, they 
conclude that the shark problem is indeed a threat to Paul’s account of 
 
5 Their account relies upon what they call the Richness Assumption: the number of types of 
experience is sufficiently large to fill in S, where S represents a spectrum of possible experiential 
outcomes for some experience, E. In this paper, I take the Richness Assumption as a given and 
will not comment on it further. 
6 I am unconvinced that their treatment of ontic vagueness is sufficient. Taking into account Delia 
Graff’s work on interest-relative theories of vagueness, it seems to me perfectly reasonable that 
what picks out the sort of vagueness at play between transformative and sharky problems is a 
question of boundlessness. As Graff argues, “we may have purposes and desires with achievement 
or satisfaction conditions that seem to us tolerant in the requisite sense, and hence boundaryless” 
(2000, 49). But my aim here is not to defend a view of experiential type categorization that turns 
on debates concerning vagueness or broader debates in semantics or metaphysics. On the contrary, 
my aim is to defend a view that turns on contestation over norms, specifically those concerning the 
relationship between embodiment, well-being, and testimony as it pertains to socially 
marginalized groups. 
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transformative experience. But this conclusion is wrong for two reasons: (A) the 
experiential kinds under discussion fail to characterize the core issue of 
personally transformative experience. (B) the real “shark problem” has been 
misidentified as a merely epistemological concern without taking into account its 
larger normative dimensions. I first address (A). 
 
Paul herself distinguishes between experiences that are epistemically 
transformative, which provide novel phenomenological content and can’t be 
cognitively modelled, and experiences that are personally transformative, which 
provide novel phenomenological content, can’t be cognitively modelled, and also 
alter one’s sense of self, priorities, preferences, and the like (2014: 155-56; cf. 
Barnes 2015).7 Paradigmatic cases of personally transformation experience 
include: “becoming a vampire,” “being a parent,” “becoming religious,” and 
“being in love.” By contrast, “eating a durian,” “seeing the aurora borealis,” and 
“flying in a plane” are cases of epistemically transformative experience. These 
two types are regularly run together by Campbell and Mosquera (see, e.g., 2020: 
3550), but they are distinguished by Paul:  
 
If we had individual-level data that could tell us how likely a particular 
outcome was for us and how we’d respond to it, then we could argue that 
big life choices should be made in the same way that we choose not to step 
in front of a bus or to be eaten by sharks. In cases like the bus or the 
sharks, we don’t need to perform an assessment of the outcome by 
cognitively modeling what it would be like, because we know what the 
results would be: we know every outcome is bad, whatever it is like… But 
for the sorts of big life choices I’ve been focusing on, we don’t have 
sufficiently detailed data to do this, and it’s not clear we ever will.” (2014: 
127, my italics). 
 
When Paul refers to “big life choices,” this is a shorthand for experiences which 
are personally transformative, not merely epistemically transformative. Note that 
the same event or process can be both epistemically and personally 
transformative, which, tellingly, are the primary cases of interest with regard to 
transformative choice and decision theory. 
 
7 Running epistemically and personally transformative experiences together is strangely common 
in the literature responding to L.A. Paul. For example, Rachel Elizabeth Fraser argues, without 
any distinctions, that transformative choices include “having a child, seeing red for the first time, 
tasting durian, gaining a new sensory ability and undergoing major surgery” (Fraser 2018, 37 fn. 
4). Yet, Paul is clear that, e.g., “tasting durian” isn’t a paradigmatic case of personally 
transformative experience. As she puts it, “they [things like tasting durian for the first time] aren’t 
the sorts of things that fundamentally change what you care about or what kind of person you take 
yourself to be” (Ibid, 16). 
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In what follows, I contrast Paul’s central case of transformative experience, being 
a parent, with the three most discussed cases of the shark problem: being eaten 
alive by sharks, being hit by a bus, and having one’s legs amputated without 
anesthesia. 
 
Experience Having a child Shark Accident Bus Accident Amputation (w/o 
anesthesia) 
Experiential Type8 Transformative Sharky Sharky Sharky 
Horribleness Pain of childbirth, 
et al. 
Being eaten alive Injury Limb amputation & 
the trauma of torture 
Outcome Being a parent Death ? Impairment 
Social Meaning Parenthood N/A ? Disability 
 
Note first that horrible experiences pertaining to having a child can be treated as 
distinct from its overall outcome and its larger personal and social meaning, even 
if they turn out to be both necessary and genuinely horrible experiences along the 
way for a given person.9 This is very different than the case of “being eaten alive 
by sharks” since it is formulated in such a manner that death is the outcome. 
Claims about the intuitive horribleness of death present unique problems, for we 
cannot experience our own death, only our own dying. I will instead assume that 
as a result one is injured in some ways but has not died from the attack.10 In the 
case of a bus accident, it is hard to know what to make of the example. Without 
any information about what happens after the accident, one could imagine 
outcomes ranging from a mere scratch and scare to living in a coma for years to 
immediate death. Because it is constructed in such a vague manner, I’ll largely 
ignore this example going forward.  
 
8 I am categorizing these types according to how L.A. Paul as well as Campbell and Mosquera 
explain them. 
9 One can of course be a parent without going through childbirth. My point is only that there are 
aspects of parenthood that would quite naturally count as “intuitively horrible” (going through 
childbirth is just one; one’s child being extremely violent and hating one is another; one’s child 
dying is another) which can be treated distinctly from the total or overall experience of parenthood 
which Paul deploys as her core example of a transformative experience. 
10 To be clear, even though “being eaten alive by sharks” is Campbell & Mosquera’s prime 
example, modifying it to avoid death strikes me as a charitable interpretation of their animating 
concern. Getting into debates about distinctions between the experience of the process of dying vs. 
the experience of death lead into very different directions than those raised by their essay. Relative 
to the context of a project like Paul’s, I don’t see how the claim that it is intuitively horrible to die 
adds anything to the discussion, for the discussion is ultimately about the relationship between 
epistemology and various forms of lived experience, not epistemology and non-experience. If one 
considers situations where people choose to die, e.g., religious self-immolation, my claim here 
might seem too fast. Whatever arguments can made about such situations, they strike me as 
distinct enough from the argumentative sphere of Paul’s claims such that they mark genuine 
exceptions (or, depending upon one’s views of the afterlife and further arguments about religious 
revelation, perhaps defenses), not threats to her theory. 
Against Intuitive Horribleness  Forthcoming in Episteme
  
Reynolds   7
 
With respect to the third example, an amputation does not necessarily result in 
death, and I take both Paul and also Campbell and Mosquera to assume it does 
not. The fact that there is no anesthesia involved is curious and sets up a strange 
contrast between the three cases. Unless one is in total shock, the experience of 
being chewed upon by a shark will be exceptionally painful. Being hit by a bus 
may also result in exceptional pain or instead in one feeling (and perhaps also 
remembering) nothing at all, especially if the accident involves a traumatic brain 
injury. Leg amputation without anesthesia, also unless one is in total shock, will 
be exceptionally painful, but in a manner that is additive. One would presumably 
be aware of the fact that it would not be painful or would at least be less painful if 
anesthesia were administrated by those amputating one’s leg, and knowledge that 
pain is being inflicted on purpose can itself intensify pain experience (Linton and 
Shaw 2011). It seems as though the “no anesthesia” qualification is meant to 
focus one’s attention on the discrete event of the amputation and the intuitive 
horribleness of that event.  
Insofar as a leg amputation results not only in an epistemic transformative (one 
the mere content of which is likely not itself worth the pain), but in a personal 
transformation (one the content of which I cannot know without being changed as 
a person), then focusing on the intuitive horribleness of the amputation goes only 
halfway. Whatever purchase the claims of intuitive horribleness may have for 
epistemically transformative experiences, they do not necessarily transfer to 
personally transformative experiences. Since I take Paul’s work to ultimately 
focus upon the latter, not the former, the pertinent question is instead about the 
intuitive horribleness of post-amputation life. It is about how one is transformed 
upon becoming, for example, a wheelchair or prosthetic user. I return to this point 
below. 
 
Further note that in the distinction between epistemic and personal 
transformation, a temporal dimension is at play. The real-life cases L.A. Paul 
focuses upon—things like becoming a parent—are complex processes that span 
months, if not many years.11 At what point upon becoming a guardian of a child 
one is “a parent” is left unspecified by Paul’s account and, it seems to me, for 
good reason. It is not clear that parents with an eight-month-old child in utero are 
in the exact same epistemic or personal-existential position as parents with a 
toddler or parents with an angsty adolescent, etc. This is not a problem for Paul’s 
 
11 Paul’s discussion of revelation, which is sometimes described as a discrete event that changes 
everything, complicates this picture. I would argue that revelations are also temporally 
distended—and (highly) socially conditioned—in various ways, but that claim is not central to the 
argument at hand. 
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account because her argument doesn’t depend on whether the “day of birth” 
parent or the “three-year-old” parent or the “angst-ridden teen” parent are in the 
same relevant situation; the point is that each are sufficiently different, not 
identically different, from the non-parent with respect to being changed as a 
knower and with respect to how the experience of being a parent (not the 
innumerable, various discrete acts involved in parenting) changes them as not just 
a knower, but also as a person (shifts in values, preferences, etc.).12 
 
Discrete events and lifelong affairs or projects are different sorts of things—the 
contrast is as strong as that which changes a very minor, nearly meaningless 
aspect of one’s experiential landscape (eating a Durian for the first time, learning 
what it is like to taste Durian, and, thereby, coming to like or dislike Durian) vs. 
that which changes one as a person (becoming a parent). Furthermore, while the 
latter is likely to have a significant set of social and political ramifications, the 
former does not. There are distinctly temporal, existential, and socio-political 
considerations at play when we consider the distinction between epistemic and 
personal transformation.13 And, as I discuss at length in sections four and five 
below, there are also normative considerations.  
 
Let us return to the sharky case of leg amputation and its relationship to intuitive 
horribleness. What does leg (lower, upper, or what have you) amputation 
necessarily result in? Disability. It means one will no longer be able to walk 
solely using the means of one’s biological body (assuming one was ambulatory 
before). On a social model of disability, amputation necessarily results in 
impairment in the sense that one’s body shifts from a phenotypical to an 
aphenotypical form (in this case: in shape, overall function, and mode of 
movement) (Cross 2016; cf. Silvers 1998). It also necessarily results in disability 
in the sense that one will now encounter a world not designed for one—one will 
instead encounter a world by and large designed for ambulatory people. That is to 
say, one must now live in a world in which wheelchair users (or prosthetics users, 
etc.) are often stigmatized and in which one must deal with the many, complex 
 
12 As Barnes (2015) argues, the idea that “being a parent” is personally transformative in the same 
way across cases is implausible. Transformative experiences come in degrees and are impacted by 
social context. “Whether a 17-year-old living in a multi-generational agrarian community in the 
1800s would, for example, experience parenthood as transformative in the same way, or the same 
degree [as an upper middle-class person living in the global North today, e.g.] seems doubtful” 
(176). 
13 As a reviewer helpfully pointed out, the multiple difficulties of prospective assessment of 
intuitively horrible events is well-documented in the psychological literature on affective 
forecasting (Wilson and Gilbert 2003) and how we are easily misguided by our “gut intuitions” 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). 
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effects of ableism, whether with respect to social life, employment, healthcare, 
political representation, or what have you (Toombs 1995). 
 
Social scientific research concerning people with lower leg amputation offers 
evidence regarding its horribleness. It turns out that the “intuitive horribleness” 
with respect to becoming paraplegic through a traumatic event gets one aspect of 
such experience correct: it is a difficult ability transition. It can throw people into 
depressive and suicidal states, especially during the first one or more years 
(Kennedy and Rogers 2000). But that research also shows that afterwards many 
people come to find new normal, new modes of flourishing, and come to enjoy 
their new paraplegic life (idem).14  
 
Does being paraplegic in and of itself mean one’s life will necessarily go worse? 
No. There is a significant body of work showing such a claim to be false (Barnes 
2016; Begnon 2020; et al.). This research demonstrates that the relationship 
between various impaired/disabled states and well-being is instead extremely 
complicated (S. M. Campbell and Stramondo 2017). That relationship is a product 
of a host of contextual factors, not factors merely pertaining to one’s form of 
embodiment (cf. the exchange between Barnes 2018; Howard and Aas 2018; 
Francis 2018).15  
 
In short, and as Elizabeth Barnes has argued in the greatest detail, disability is not 
bad simpliciter. However one ultimately judges this literature, to focus merely on 
the moments of becoming-impaired (and especially if that transition involves 
painful, even tortuous experiences), misses the point about not simply what it is 
like to be disabled in this or that manner in a narrow sense, but what lived 
experiences of disability amount to in any given case. To focus on the moments of 
a shark attack or the moments of amputation, anesthetized or not, fails to 
appreciate the import of the thesis of personally transformative experience and 
instead functions as a red herring by focusing upon discrete, highly painful 
experiences and/or ability transitions that ignore or distort a wide range of 
evidence concerning the lived experiences of disability. 
 
14 The recent film The Sound of Metal offers an insightful depiction of such a transition with 
respect to the case of total hearing loss and how an ability transition like that turns heavily on 
questions of community and of adjusting, or failing to adjust, one’s expectations. 
15 To argue in this way assumes that the shark attack or amputation doesn’t result in neuropathic 
pain, which in fact could makes one’s life go necessarily worse (Nadelhoffer 2019) But, tellingly, 
specifics like this—ones which draw on nuanced debates in the large literatures spanning 
philosophy of disability and disability studies—aren’t part of the analysis. This is worrisome, for 
paraplegia and neuropathic pain are both candidate cases for transformative experience and the 
particularity of those experiences aren’t sufficiently captured by whatever cause leads to them. I 
discuss this in more detail in in sections 4.1 and 5 below. 
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Being non-ambulatory will result in one experiencing a world designed for 
ambulatory and otherwise able-bodied people. That world is often frustrating to 
navigate and frustrating in many other respects due to the exclusions of the built 
world, a world which does not, on the whole, practice universal design, but 
instead able-bodied design (Hamraie 2017). Still if one listens to the testimony of 
people who in fact use wheelchairs for mobility, that doesn’t thereby make such a 
life horrible (Kafer 2013; Mairs 1996). Let us assume that, at minimum, you must 
use a wheelchair of some sort to get around after either of these events. What does 
research say about the wellbeing of wheelchair users with respect to their use of 
wheelchairs? It suggests that most experience the use of a wheelchair as freedom, 
as a tool that affords them self-determination to do a host of activities (Wolbring 
2003). Depending upon context, certain electronic wheelchairs allow greater, 
faster, and even more enjoyable freedom of movement than using one’s own two 
legs would (just consider the amount of people who purposely and joyfully use 
scooters, electric bikes, or any number of other powered devices to get from point 
A to B as opposed to simply walking). In others, it of course would not.16 The 
mere fact that one uses a wheelchair does not entail that one’s life will be horrible. 
Intuitions that it will be horrible fly in the face of evidence concerning the lived 
experience of those who actually use wheelchairs (Galli et al. 2015).17 
 
Consider the following argument: while L.A. Paul is right to claim that while we 
cannot judge what it means to be a parent because becoming a parent transforms 
us a knower, we can nevertheless judge the pain of childbirth18 to be horrible or 
 
16 Barnes’ discussion of how personal psychological features in concert with various social facts 
can alter the extent to which a given experience is personally transformative is illuminating and, I 
think, correct on this point (2015). The alteration can also shift the valence of the “same” 
personally transformative experience. For example, if you live somewhere without any disability 
community and where disability rights are largely absent, it will make it harder for the transition 
to living with an impairment with paraplegia to be personally transformative in a positive respect. 
17 It is telling, but perhaps unsurprising that object of the “intuitive horribleness” claim concerning 
becoming paraplegic is indefensibly fixated upon the initial state of transition—not the overall life 
and potential personal transformations that follow. There are many reasons for this sort of mistake. 
Humans exhibit durability bias, the tendency to overpredict the duration of affective reactions, 
however grounded, to future events, and this is due in part to focalism, the tendency to focus too 
much on an event in one’s immediate attentional field and not consequences of other future events 
(Wilson et al. 2000). In short, we predictably misremember, misrepresent, and mispredict both 
past and future states of happiness and sadness, pleasure and pain, in relation to singular events, 
not to mention complex sets of events that impact the course of one’s life. Focalism also 
contributes to pain catastrophizing, the fact that we regularly overestimate the intensity and 
duration of pain (Crombez et al. 1998). This further suggests that we can significantly 
mischaracterize, mispredict, and generally misestimate the meaning of any phenomenon we 
assume to cause pain. This includes the vast range of phenomena we categorize as “disabilities” 
insofar as many often fallaciously associate or equate disability with pain and suffering (Reynolds 
2022)  
18 It is typically described by pain specialists as one of the more painful experiences a human can 
undergo. Cf. (Wall et al. 2006). 
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the raising of a child who is consistently violent towards and abhors one as 
horrible or the early death of one’s child as horrible. While the intuitive 
horribleness of each of these may be related to any given case of parenthood, 
none—even in combination—exhaust the meaning or overall lived experience of 
parenthood as a whole. Those events do not capture the meaning of being a 
parent. They are claims about intuitive horribleness that treat the experientially 
discrete as a synecdoche for the experientially continuous. They mistake gaining 
novel phenomenological content through a bad experience for being transformed 
as a person as a result of those gains in combination with a range of other factors 
in the context of the meaning-making projects of a life.  
But this is not all—they also overgeneralize the character of the discrete, 
supposedly intuitively horrible, events in question. For example, a not 
insignificant number of women go out of their way to have an unmedicated birth, 
and, in effect, actively seek out experiencing its pain more fully (Ossola et al. 
2019).  Complicating the matter further, a large number of births are, on the 
contrary, medicated and hence not especially painful (Butwick et al. 2018). Even 
if for a given individual, or even group, the pain of childbirth were traumatizing 
and even if—to consider a possibility that is distinct in many, many ways—one’s 
child were to turn out consistently violent and hateful or dies at an early age, none 
of these hypotheticals will definitively decide the debate over the way in which 
becoming a parent shifts the parameters of one’s judgment, i.e., one’s standing as 
a knower, concerning parenthood. Note that whatever happens over the course of 
hours, days, weeks, months, or even years is not necessarily definitive of a life 
project or of a form of life, a determinate way of being in the world. In this 
experiential and reflective span lies the theoretical rub. The thesis of personally 
transformative experience is ultimately about existential ventures and 
undertakings, not isolated events and activities.  
To take another of Paul’s central examples, consider how strange it would be to 
claim that Paul’s opening discussion of becoming a vampire fails to demonstrate 
the problem of transformative experience merely because being violently bitten in 
the neck is intuitively horrible (I am happy to admit that I judge being so bitten, 
i.e., non-consensually, as intuitively horrible). In the same way, to infer from the 
presumed intuitive horribleness of childbirth—or fill-in-the-blank with respect to 
what can happen over the course of parenting—to the intuitive horribleness of 
being a parent is patently misguided. And yet the shark problem, assuming it 
doesn’t end in death as I qualify the problem above, makes precisely that 
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argumentative move. This is a mistake. Paul’s discussions of personally 
transformative experience are about forms of life, not discrete events simpliciter.19 
 
3.1   The real sharky problem 
 
I claimed above that the implications of the “shark problem” are wrong for two 
reasons: (A) the experiential kinds under discussion are indefensibly diverse and 
fail to characterize the core issue of personally transformative experience, and (B) 
the real “shark problem” has been misidentified as a merely epistemological 
concern without taking into account its normative dimensions. Having addressed 
(A), I now turn to (B). 
 
The distinction between sharky and non-sharky problems lies in the following: 
how we typologize experiences and how we judge others’ experiences in relation 
to those types or kinds. Call the results of typologizing experience experiential 
kinds. While assessing experiential kinds will perforce involve definitions and 
various criteria, such assessments will also invariably involve norms. These will 
include norms about how we judge experiences far from our own, but in 
connection with the same experiential kind. To get a sense of this issue, just 
consider those who have a dog and thereby assert that they are in a solid epistemic 
position to make claims about human parenting or those who are secular, yet 
intrigued by and in principle open to the idea of the divine, and thereby assert that 
they are in a solid epistemic position to make claims about living a religious life. 
“Being a dog person” is one sort of experiential kind. “Being a parent” is another. 
“Being open to the divine” is one sort of experiential kind; “being actively 
religious” is another. Whether or not we take ourselves to have purchase on a 
given experiential kind, the more pressing issue is how we take up and how we 
integrate testimony from others concerning experiential kinds—and not just those 
different from our own but also those that we intuitively consider to be close and 
even similar to our own. 
 
There is a large anthropological literature focused upon analyzing practices that 
one society/culture judges as intuitively horrible and that another society/culture 
judges as not merely reasonable, but even required (rituals of maturity, acts in the 
 
19 One might counter that Paul does talk about discrete events and the transformative effects they 
have. It is upon being bitten by a vampire that one becomes a vampire. But it seems to me a very 
strange reading of Paul’s scholarship on this issue to attach the “transformative” aspect of 
“transformative experience” to discrete events. I don’t see how someone could read her work and 
think that her claims reduce in such a manner. As an analogy, it would be equally strange to 
reduce research on the phenomenology of living with X diagnosis to research on the moment of 
receiving the diagnosis of X. Cf. fn. 9 above. 
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service of in-group bonding, practices to accomplish certain gender norms, etc.). 
An obvious and hotly contested example is female circumcision, also referred to 
as female genital cutting (Abusharaf 2013). I will not here take a stand on that 
debate, and my argument does not require doing so. I am instead noting the large 
body of work that suggests a defining part of what is at stake in claims of intuitive 
horribleness to be not simply a question of extrapolation from one’s experience to 
different degrees of that experience, but instead a question of how various values 
inform one’s judgment about what counts as horrible or not horrible in the first 
place and the way in which one takes up or denies the testimony of others, 
including groups of others. 
 
I take this to be part of the insight of Paul’s work on personally transformative 
experience: it is the unique and social quality of certain transformative 
experiences that result (or fail to result) in personal transformation (cf. Barnes 
2015). The convert to Jainism does not, without further analysis, undergo the 
exact same experience as the convert to Buddhism or Christianity or Islam—nor 
do all parents undergo the same experience of parenthood.20 All of these might, 
on Paul’s account, qualify as personally transformative experiences, but the extent 
to which they are similar requires one to take up the testimony of others and to 
look to other forms of evidence as well—most notably qualitative social scientific 
evidence concerning the particularity of those religious traditions and the ways in 
which a given person does or does not take up aspects of a specific tradition 
relative to their sociocultural, historical, and political context. The qualitative 
differences between transformative experiences that we treat of an experiential 
kind are a crucial part of how we analyze and argue about the meaning of not only 
the transformative experiences in question, but transformative experience more 
generally. 
 
Even if there were a person who, across some period of time, converts to Jainism, 
then Buddhism, then Islam, and then Shinto, it would be strange to find them an 
expert on the conversion between each to each or even of “conversion” itself. On 
the contrary, we would rightly wonder whether or not the many shifts instead 
indicate something about the relative depth of the transformative nature of these 
conversions if the shifts in religious affiliation could change at such a pace in such 
a way. This is not to say that this person would necessarily be inauthentic; it is 
instead to say that whatever they experienced would be prima facie different from 
one who converts and then holds to that conversion dearly for the rest of their life. 
 
20 Though my argument here is ultimately anchored in philosophy of religion, even a cursory 
knowledge of these religious traditions would suggest that what such a conversion means at the 
level of lived experience will be quite different. These religions, to put things crudely, organize 
and make meaning of the world in importantly distinct ways. 
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The nature of the transformative experience of each of those conversions would, 
justifiably, be called in question since the relationship between lived experience 
and time would be in play.21 Therein lies the rub: philosophical investigation into 
lived experience involves dimensions that go beyond both testimony and 
intuition. 
 
This is hard for some to accept regarding certain putatively “obvious” 
experiences. Consider how common it is for able-bodied people to think they 
know something about disability insofar as they can “imagine” what it is to be 
without an ability they have. The able-bodied (academic) person might think, for 
example, “Surely I know what it is like to use a wheelchair. I sit in a chair all day 
with wheels. It takes little to extrapolate from that to using a chair to get around 
for all my tasks.” The sighted person might think that by closing their eyes and/or 
walking around with a “blindfold” for a bit they have a sense of what it means to 
be blind. A wide range of humanistic, social scientific, and scientific evidence 
points in the other direction (Hull 1997; Magee 1996; Glenney 2013).  
If this seems strange, and without getting lost in the minutia of neuroscientific 
debates, there is a profound difference between simply using a device and 
incorporating it into one’s body schema (Titchkosky, Healey, and Michalko 
2019). For an ambulatory person to assess the testimony of a paraplegic or for a 
sighted person to assess the testimony of someone who is blind is not primarily an 
exercise in cognitive modelling. You can’t model yourself into a different body 
schema. The neurological differences between one who is ambulatory vs. one 
who is non-ambulatory or one who is sighted vs. one who is blind are not made 
experientially available via projections or modelling, for it is both neurobiological 
and phenomenological differences at play.22 Accordingly, assessing such 
testimony is always, in part, an exercise in trust. But that trust is not limited to 
taking another’s testimony seriously, i.e., to how one judges testimonial evidence 
alone. There is also evidence in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities that 
can provide insights into not simply how those claims about lived experience 
ought to be judged, but also about the conditions under which and context through 
which those experiences bear out. The latter are considerations which help one 
not merely assess truth or falsity, but also come to understand the meaningfulness 
of the lived experience in question.  
 
21 This is why I am largely in agreement with Elizabeth Barnes’ arguments concerning the 
contingency and context-dependence of transformative experiences. See (Barnes 2015). 
22 Just to focus on the neurobiological considerations for a moment, the brain depends in important 
ways on subjects’ primary sense modalities. Blind individuals process and represent auditory and 
other inputs differently from sighted individuals, which is one reason amongst many why, for the 
sighted, simply donning a blindfold is inadequate.  
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In short, the reasons we give for how and why we experience a given 
phenomenon as we do turn not merely on our ability to cognitively model things 
but also on how other people offer testimony concerning their own related 
experiences as well as the vast array of information available to understand the 
meaning of such claims.23 To vary an example given above, experiencing the pain 
of a broken arm or the pain of a botched tonsillectomy does not entail knowing 
the meaning of living in chronic pain; nor does the reverse. Living in chronic pain 
does not entail knowing the pain of torture; nor does the reverse (cf. Klein 2007). 
The fact that we use the word ‘pain’ for all the latter experiences is certainly part 
of the problem in this specific example, for the linguistic elasticity of certain 
concepts can easily mislead careful analysis, as Socrates (not just Wittgenstein) 
long ago lamented. But the limitations of various languages or particular concepts 
is not the primary problem at hand—how we treat the testimony of others 
concerning the typologization of experience is. 
In sum, the reasons I might give for judging a shark attack as intuitively horrible 
are less valuable than the testimony of what it is like by someone who has been 
attacked by sharks and whose account of that attack further involves its 
relationship to their life afterwards. And just as I should not take one’s claims 
concerning the intuitive horribleness of a shark attack due to mere extrapolation 
from non-shark-related pain, I should not take the testimony of a shark attack 
survivor as the final or total word on its phenomenological character. Evidence 
from other sources, including any number of humanistic, social scientific, and 
scientific approaches, is also requisite.  
4   The disability paradox and epistemic injustice 
 
All of this being said, the problem of skepticism remains. A paraplegic, as a result 
of a tragic accident, who reports it being the best thing that ever happened to them 
might be/likely will be met with skepticism.24 But to prima facie judge such an 
account as irrational or suspect begs the question yet again. Recall that the whole 
point of the thesis of personally transformative experience is that intuitions about 
such things are vacuous insofar as they track an experience that one has not only 
 
23 The idea that experiential kinds transfer across certain categories (e.g., the idea that “I am 
white,” “I am able to walk,” or “I have experienced pain,” offer knowledge of, say, “I am Black,” 
“I am paraplegic,” or “I am a chronic pain sufferer”) is an epistemically and politically fraught 
endeavor. Experiencing the meaning of whiteness does not automatically entail gaining experience 
or knowledge concerning the meaning of being Asian or the meaning of being Black. 
Experiencing the meaning of being able to walk does not entail knowing the many ways—and 
complex situations that result—in which people get around without walking. Etc. 
24 Just as parents who have experienced the death of a child who still report becoming a parent as 
their greatest joy might be/likely will be met with skepticism. 
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not undergone, but also through which one has not been transformed as a knower. 
Intuitions are products not simply of epistemology, but also lived experience and 
one’s life as a whole as shaped by social, cultural, historical, and political factors, 
and to take such vacuous intuitions seriously has not just epistemological, but also 
socio-political ramifications. How we treat the rules/norms by which we judge 
intuitions to have or not have epistemic purchase matters.  
 
There are many reasons to fight against these tendencies, not least of which 
includes how they contribute to various forms of epistemic injustice. There is a 
mountain of research on various experiences of paraplegia. If you are ambulatory 
and upon walking to the grocery store tomorrow, you are hit by a car and become 
paraplegic, you do not in that moment or the next day (or even in the next few 
months) become an expert on living with paraplegia.25 To claim—for example, 
two weeks or even six months into one’s experience—that being hit by that car is 
the worst thing ever26 and that that life is not worth living is a claim that should be 
assessed in light of the resources from people who have been paraplegic for years, 
including those with congenital forms of paraplegia. To downgrade the credibility 
of those who are paraplegic in light of one’s fleeting intuition is a form of 
testimonial injustice and to further not engage the large body of knowledge 
concerning paraplegia is a form of hermeneutical injustice. 
 
On my account, analysis of the disability paradox raises the claim of “intuitive 
horribleness” from a run-of-the-mill philosophical charge to a question of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. It is not just that different sets of 
epistemic resources are at play; it is also that available resources are willfully 
being ignored. By willfully ignoring them, one actively contributes to epistemic 
injustices against those for whom those epistemic resources are important. 
Imagine a convert to a new religion who judged that shift without spending any 
time talking with those of the same religion, without digging into relevant texts, 
including its core sacred text(s) and its tenets, and without participating in its core 
rituals27. If such a person espoused a view about that religion a number of months 
 
25 If one takes qualitative social scientific research into account, there are good reasons to think 
that one will give particularly unreliable testimony about paraplegia as such in those timeframes 
because the transition from ambulation to paraplegia is notoriously difficult in ways that suggest 
the difficulty of the transition will overdetermine the meaning of whatever various end-states one 
experiences. 
26 To be sure, those who become wheelchair-users after an accident that leads to a form of 
paraplegia are not simply dealing with a shift in their relationship to their body but a shift in their 
relationship to others—including society at large. They are forced to shift not just how they, but 
about how others think about their body. Shifts in ability such as this are not analogizable from the 
ambulatory person who simply imagines or otherwise attempts to cognitively model paraplegia. 
27 Here, as above, I use examples from religious practices as a way to gain insights about claims of 
intuitive horribleness, specifically claims that track disability experiences. I hope it goes without 
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into their conversion—whether negative, positive, or somewhere in between—one 
would rightly question their epistemic standing because they not only failed to do 
the epistemic work necessary for their claims to meaningfully track the lived 
experiences and larger form of life about which they are making a claim, but they 
ignored the hermeneutic resources at their disposal. Among its many issues, the 
shark problem relies upon the same moves as that misguided person. 
 
One might object that a result of my account is that none of us can engage in any 
meaningful risk reasoning or decision making about the future. The uptake of my 
argument, such a critic might argue, is that it is irrational to even try to avoid or 
pursue any event that will change your life. If becoming paraplegic doesn’t 
qualify as a sharky problem, then what norms are at play to avoid accidents? Why 
do we even need things like crosswalks? This objection draws conclusions that I 
do not defend and which do not follow from the arguments presented here. I 
argued that Paul’s claims concerning transformative experience turn upon the 
impact and quality of lifelong affairs, not the what-it-is-like of various discrete 
events, whether unanesthetized amputation or what have you. I do think that one 
should in general avoid amputation, being hit by a bus, or being attacked by 
sharks. That is not the point. To think it is the point is to fall into the very 
cognitive trap against which I am arguing: a failure to appreciate the differences 
and nuances between the experientially discrete and the continuous, between the 
epistemically and personally transformative, and between the constituent and the 
constitutive. 
 
To summarize, if one accepts the thesis of transformative experience, this implies 
a normative commitment; namely, that (a) one refrain from making categorical 
judgments about experiences that, for one, would be personally transformative—
even if one takes various aspects of one’s own experience to judge their onset or 
various discrete, involved experiences to be horrible, and (b) one defers to, and 
learns from, those who have actually had such experiences in order to assess 
judgments about them. Given the literature on epistemic injustice, this is 
especially important when the judgments concerning lived experience track that 




saying that I do not do so in a manner that treats religious experiences and disability experiences 
as straightforwardly analogous. I don’t think they are. However, I hope that setting up this contrast 
is illuminating. I understand what I’m up to less as a method or process of analogizing and more 
as what Desiree Valentine discerningly calls “resistant juxtaposition”. Cf. (Valentine 2020) 
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5   Conclusion 
 
I have argued that testimonial and hermeneutical injustice are baked into most 
deployments of the concept of intuitive horribleness, and that, even if one were to 
justify its use in select cases, it should be accompanied with prima facie 
suspicion. To go beyond the trappings of intuition requires work. Philosophically, 
socially, politically, legally, et al., there are high stakes with respect to whether or 
not we consider “being attacked by sharks” and “undergoing an amputation” as 
instances of a unified experiential kind or, what’s more, as cases that inform us 
about personally transformative experience. As I have argued, whatever those 
discrete experiences have in common is beside the point of debates over 
transformative experience. Neither refers to forms of life; neither refers to a set of 
experiences that would constitute a personally transformative experience. On the 
contrary, both fail to address the most relevant aspects of experience in which 
each result: becoming impaired and thereby experiencing disability. Becoming 
impaired and disabled in these ways relates to the experiences of actually existing 
people and communities.  
 
Testimony concerning experiences like amputation are not merely a question of 
the relationship between general experiences (like pain) and extrapolations 
thereof (like chronic pain or torture), but of how real, existing people undergo 
these specific experiences and how they take up them up as shaping their life and 
life projects.28 The challenge of what Campbell and Mosquera (Phil. Stud. 2020) 
call the shark problem for transformative experience fails to appreciate the 
distinction between epistemically and personally transformative experiences, fails 
to take the role of temporality seriously, and fails to appreciate normative 
considerations involved in claims of intuitive horribleness.29 If, as I have argued, 
disability experiences are what L.A. Paul calls personally transformative 
experiences, experiences which one cannot evaluate and compare without having 
undergone oneself, then the shark problem and the disability paradox are less a 
problem and a paradox and, instead, simply more reasons to question doxastic 




28 As a reviewer pointed out to me, in addition to claims about adaptive preferences, some also 
suggest that disabled people’s testimony concerning their own well-being reflects cognitive 
dissonance. As I hope is clear at this point in the argument, that non-disabled people don’t or can’t 
believe such testimony results in multiple types of epistemic injustice, the cognitive dissonance 
charge being merely another case. 
29 This holds whether one defends a mere-difference, justice-based, or other sort of empirically 
informed theory of disability (Barnes 2016; Begon, Phil. Stud. 2020). 
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